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Abstract Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has 
experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation 
and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses 
on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, 
something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting 
the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual 
constitution from a discursive perspective, it articulates a brief yet comprehensive 
genealogy of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in Greece, 
exploring their discursive strategies. Moving on, it identifies the main characteristics 
this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden socio-
political field, highlighting the implications for a contemporary understanding of 
cleavages, with potentially broader implications.  
Keywords Populism ∙ Anti-populism ∙ Cleavage ∙ Greece ∙ Crisis ∙ Mediation ∙ 
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Introduction 
Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep 
socio-economic dislocation, leading to a severe crisis of representation and, finally, 
triggering new populist mobilisations as well as anti-populist reactions. This, however, 
was not the first time the populism/anti-populism divide became a key factor in the 
Greek post-authoritarian context. It was rather the reactivation of a salient feature that 
has defined the Greek public sphere since the early 1980s, when the populist party 
PASOK established its long hegemony. Yet, while aspects of this antagonistic 
dialectic between populism and anti-populism have been occasionally discussed in the 
relevant literature (Lyrintzis, 2005; Pantazopoulos, 2011; Sevastakis and Stavrakakis, 
2012), its real nature and implications have not been properly investigated. 
Political scientists such as Nikiforos Diamandouros and Takis Pappas may have 
captured the importance of antagonism and polarisation – discussed by Diamandouros 
in terms of a pervasive ‘dualism’ – as well as the central role of populism in this 
division (Diamandouros, 1994; Pappas, 2014); however, over-identifying with a 
perspective premised on essentialised, euro-centric theories of modernisation and thus 
a priori accepting a one-sided, pejorative understanding of populism, they have failed 
to offer a truly reflexive theorisation of the populism/anti-populism frontier and of the 
role of both sides involved in constructing and reproducing it.  
The present article is envisaged as responding to this gap in the literature. In order to 
do this, the ‘important notion of anti-populism’ which ‘has never really been studied 
or thematized as such’ (Ostiguy, 2009: 23–4) needs to be brought to the fore. Hence, 
highlighting the need to study populism and anti-populism together and focusing on 
their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective (Stavrakakis et al., 2017), we 
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will articulate a brief yet comprehensive analysis of populist and anti-populist actors 
(parties and media) in contemporary Greece. In doing so, we reconstruct the 
development of the populist/anti-populist divide in Greece’s post-authoritarian history, 
up until the recent crisis. Moving on, we identify the main characteristics (actors and 
strategies) this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden 
public sphere. We conclude by drawing some implications for the broader area of 
populism research in Southern Europe and beyond. 
Conceptual Clarifications: Populism, Crisis, Mediation, Anti-Populism 
In line with an evolving consensus between discursive and ideational definitions (see 
Mudde and Kaltwasser 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), we understand 
populism as a specific type of discourse which claims to express popular interests and 
to represent associated identities and demands (the ‘will of the people’) against an 
‘establishment’ or elite, which is seen as undermining these and forestalling their 
satisfaction (see also Salgado and Stavrakakis, 2018). Accordingly, populist 
discursive representations typically articulate a polarised antagonistic framing of the 
socio-political field, in a bid to inspire and mobilise frustrated/excluded social groups. 
The latter (named as ‘the people,’ the ‘underdog,’ ‘the many,’ etc.) are called to 
establish horizontal links (what Ernesto Laclau calls ‘chains of equivalence’), which 
will enable them to effectively challenge the established power structure and to 
influence decision-making (Laclau, 2005). But how and when does populism emerge 
and/or succeed? 
Researchers have often stressed the central role that some notion of ‘crisis’ plays in 
the manifestation of populist phenomena (Laclau, 1977: 175; Taggart, 2000: 2, 4–5, 
93–94, 117; Roberts, 2015). Benjamin Moffitt has recently placed emphasis on the 
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performative construction of crisis by populist discourse itself: ‘if we do not have the 
performance of crisis, we do not have populism’ (2015: 190). Connecting both 
perspectives, Ernesto Laclau has highlighted the dual character of social dislocation: a 
dislocation, the failure of an established system of representation to effectively 
incorporate an ‘anomaly’ (or ‘failure’) is presupposed as a triggering mechanism for 
new populist (and other) discursive constructions performatively narrating its 
characteristics and offering distinct political solutions (1990: 63, 65). In this approach, 
the real of the crisis (what others would call the ‘objective’ dimension of the crisis) 
becomes accessible through mediation, through its performative construction and 
representation by populist discourse (Stavrakakis et al., 2017). 
Hence, according to an Essex School perspective, it is through the performative 
articulation of such narratives that ‘discourses’ are constituted and identities assumed. 
In addition, this process invariably involves ‘the construction of antagonisms and the 
drawing of political frontiers between “insiders” and “outsiders” ’ (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000: 4). In this sense, discursive articulation relies on blame attribution, 
on the affective investment of difference through the identification of ‘constitutive 
outsides’, thus sustaining binary oppositions such as us/them (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000: 22). Similar conclusions can be drawn from a framing perspective. 
In order to render our experience meaningful, framing efforts are supposed to identify 
problems, diagnose causes and assign blame (Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford 
1988; Kuypers, 2010): ‘framing processes also allow for the definition of the self and 
the opponents, in short for the definition of the “us” and the “them” category’ (Caiani 
and Della Porta 2011: 182). 
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Such a discursive and/or rhetorical perspective on framing and articulation processes 
alerts us to something rarely highlighted in populism research: it is never only one 
political force that is engaged in the aforementioned process. In fact, for every 
populist actor asserting its presence, there are other anti-populist actors antagonising 
it. Hence our hypothesis is that it is not just populists who take advantage of a crisis 
situation in a bid to mobilise subjects and put forward a counter-hegemonic project. 
Hegemonic political forces and mainstream media are often the first ones to pursue a 
(radically anti-populist) construction of the crisis, for example, shifting the blame on 
to the ‘populists’ themselves. 
In other words, it is impossible to effectively study populism without carefully 
examining anti-populism (Stavrakakis, 2014; Katsambekis, 2016a). And yet we rarely 
encounter attempts to define ‘anti-populism’ in ways that highlight its specificity as a 
type of discursive articulation and communication strategy. For example, recent 
studies of populist blame attribution in Greece never thematise anti-populism per se 
(see Gerodimos 2013; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). 
Populism and Anti-Populism in Post-Authoritarian Greece (1974–2009) 
Greece’s democratic history has been marked by populist mobilisations but also by 
periods when anti-populist actors and discourses dominated the public sphere. Indeed, 
it might make sense to refer to Albert Hirschman’s (2002) ‘shifting involvements’ to 
better grasp the pendulum movement between periods in which populism is dominant 
and others in which anti-populist technocratic frames prevail. Initially, democracy 
was consolidated within the context of a polarised political system in which left-wing 
(populist/progressive) and right-wing (anti-populist/conservative) forces, represented 
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by PASOK1 and New Democracy (ND)2 respectively, defended competing 
programmes, thus building and disseminating antagonistic collective identities (see 
Voulgaris, 2001). The moment of ‘crisis’ common to both narratives was the 
dictatorship era (1967–1974), which was recognised by all political forces as a major 
setback, if not a catastrophe. 
At first, the paternalistic (but thoroughly anti-populist) figure of Konstantinos 
Karamanlis, a right-wing conservative politician, managed to secure for his newly 
established party, ND, two undisrupted terms in power (1974–1981). Karamanlis’s 
narrative was one of stability, reconciliation and national unity on the road to EEC 
accession; and he managed to attract a majority of Greeks, who, after seven years of 
anomaly, preferred a controlled transition to democracy rather than a radical break 
(Pappas, 2014: 15–16). By the late 1970s, however, and throughout the 1980s, the 
political stage was dominated by a counter-hegemonic project: PASOK’s archetypal 
populism and the figure of its charismatic leader, Andreas Papandreou. PASOK put 
forward the demands of the so-called ‘non-privileged’ for social justice, popular 
sovereignty and national independence, against an ‘establishment’ accused of 
monopolising political access and economic privilege in various ways since the end of 
the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). 
                                                 
1 PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) was founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974. Emerging 
initially as a radical-left political force, it adopted a more moderate profile in the 1980s, to gradually 
join the trajectory of third-way European social-democracy from the mid-1990s onwards. It was one of 
the main pillars of the Greek two-party system but its popular support deteriorated after its 
implementation of the first wave of austerity (2009–2012). 
2 Founded in 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND is a centre-right conservative party and one of the 
pillars of the Greek two-party system. 
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Perhaps inspired by Peron’s identification with the descamisados (‘the shirtless’), 
Papandreou in the 1970s communicated his anti-systemic bid to represent the non-
privileged by avoiding wearing ties, preferring his landmark turtleneck sweater. It was 
through such enactments of the politically incorrect and by articulating publicly the 
previously unsayable (for example, attacking local elites and global powers like the 
US) that Papandreou managed to performatively cultivate his populist charisma.3 
PASOK’s populist rhetoric gained massive popular support, resulting in a remarkable 
48.07 per cent of the vote in the 1981 election (Spourdalakis, 1988). 
In 1989, PASOK faced defeat, following a massive scandal that allegedly involved its 
leader. Greece itself entered a period of turbulence, holding three consecutive 
elections within less than a year, until a government (that of Konstantinos Mitsotakis 
and ND) could enjoy a fragile majority in parliament. Interestingly, Mitsotakis’s 
government (1990–1993) was probably the first one to be directly registered as ‘anti-
populist’, since it chose to attack PASOK and its leader with reference to their 
populism, demagoguery, irresponsibility, etc. (Vernardakis, 2011: 3; Voulgaris, 2001: 
321), while trying to implement a programme based on labour- and market-
deregulation, privatisation and restrictive fiscal policies. 
Coping with the reasons for its defeat and internal crisis, PASOK gradually developed 
a similar anti-populist narrative, which attributed the blame for the party’s – as well as 
for Greece’s – problems to ‘populism’. This movement from populism to anti-
populism had its roots in the interventions of Costas Simitis, a minister in Andreas 
Papandreou’s administrations who would later become president of PASOK and 
                                                 
3 For a discursive, performative theory of charisma, see Scott, 1990; Stavrakakis, 2015. 
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prime minister. Simitis had argued, from the 1980s, that PASOK should become a 
‘force of modernisation’, adopting an emphatically anti-populist identity and strategy 
(Pantazopoulos, 2011). In a sense, Mitsotakis and Simitis can be regarded as key 
actors involved in the anti-populist swing of the pendulum away from populist 
rhetoric during the 1990s. 
Soon, confrontations on the left/right axis gave way to a discourse of consensus 
accompanied by the constant denunciation of populism, which was a way for the 
PASOK of Simitis to renounce the party’s ‘egalitarian’ past. On the centre-right, ND 
followed the ‘moderation’ trend, electing a new centrist and consensus-oriented leader, 
Costas Karamanlis (nephew of Konstantinos), who also named ‘populism’ as one of 
his main enemies, identifying it with PASOK and its legacy in government; he 
launched a new communication strategy of Clinton-inspired ‘triangulation’ in the late 
1990s (Katsambekis, 2016a).  
Despite the privileging of consensus by traditional political parties, the socio-political 
field started to become more contentious after 2008. If the trauma of the 1967–1974 
dictatorship and the post-civil-war regime triggered a gradual polarisation along the 
populism/anti-populism axis and a delayed populist hegemony, the turn of events put 
in motion by the recent economic crisis had even more profound effects on the 
political system, leading to a speedy reactivation of the populism/anti-populism 
divide and a consolidation of a (precarious) populist hegemony within just a few years. 
Enter Crisis: Reactivating the Populism/Anti-Populism Divide 
The eventual breakdown of 2010 shook previously existing alliances, collective 
identities, loyalties and social compromises, initiating a radical dislocation of Greek 
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society and politics. The trends of public discourse shifted violently from individualist 
cynicism to ‘punitive asceticism’: ‘we lived beyond our means’, ‘the party is over’, 
‘we all “ate” the money together’, were characteristic mottos of a dominant political 
and media discourse that was used to spread feelings of collective blame and guilt 
(Stavrakakis, 2016; 2013). The ‘irresponsible populism’ of the past decades that 
‘flattered the people’ with false promises was identified as the root of Greece’s 
collective pathology (Sevastakis and Stavrakakis, 2012). In this sense, anti-populist 
representations of the crisis were already playing a key role in mediating blame 
attribution even before the emergence of popular resistances to austerity. Anti-
populist narratives were actually dominant in the public sphere, articulated both by 
mainstream media and traditional political forces; they were only challenged after the 
emergence of the aganaktismenoi (‘indignant’) movement in May 2011 and (even 
more so) after the elections of May–June 2012, which resulted in a major political 
realignment.  
PASOK, under the leadership of George Papandreou (son of Andreas), having 
returned to power, was the party that struggled with the administration of the crisis in 
its first phase. The optimistic narrative (promising fairer taxation, participatory 
democracy and ‘green growth’) that brought it to power in October 2009 – 
stigmatised as ‘populist’ by ND – had to be abandoned within a few months, as 
Greece faced severe difficulties due to its massive deficit and inability to sustain debt 
repayments. With the country standing on the verge of bankruptcy, an ad hoc 
mechanism was put together by the EU and the IMF, offering emergency loans under 
the condition that a programme of structural reforms and harsh austerity was 
implemented (Pappas, 2014). 
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After the implementation of the first wave of austerity, Greek society entered a period 
of significant turbulence as GDP contracted, unemployment soared and salaries, along 
with pensions, were severely cut. The months that followed witnessed various forms 
of massive collective action against the government. The most salient movement of 
that period was that of the so-called aganaktismenoi which followed the 
demonstrations of the Indignados and the 15-M movement in Spain in May 2011 
(Kioupkiolis and Seoane Pérez, 2018). A grassroots populist movement claiming to 
represent the will of ‘the people’ against an alienated and unresponsive ‘establishment’ 
(Prentoulis and Thomassen, 2014), this was probably the first serious challenge to the 
anti-populist discourse of the Greek government and mainstream media, coming from 
‘below’. 
With social tensions on the rise, George Papandreou was soon forced to resign and 
PASOK, with ND and smaller parties (initially, the extreme-right LAOS and later on 
the moderate-left DIMAR), formed a series of coalition governments. Thus Greece’s 
traditional parties co-governed for the first time, sharing a very similar rhetoric, which 
denounced any opposition to the implementation of the ‘bail-out’ programme as 
‘populism’. It is from this moment (the formation of the Papademos government in 
November 2011) onwards that the division between alleged ‘populist’ and ‘anti-
populist’ political parties coincided with that between ‘moderate’ (or mainstream) 
forces and those that acted as ‘challengers’. Things were much more complicated up 
to that point. Antonis Samaras’s ND – the centre-right ‘pillar’ of the party system – 
exhibited strong nationalist (and some populist) characteristics between the election of 
2009 and its collaboration with PASOK in 2011. In that period, ND castigated 
PASOK’s policies regarding the administration of the crisis – especially its decision 
Published in European Political Science, First Online: 22 January 2018, DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-017-0138-3 
11 
 
to sign the so-called ‘memorandum’ (the written agreement between Greece and its 
lenders regarding the first bailout package, signed on May 2010) – and tried to 
articulate an alternative (see Gemenis and Nezi, 2015; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). It is 
crucial to stress, however, that ND’s opposition to PASOK up until their collaboration 
was mostly based on moralistic arguments, stressing that ‘the memorandum was 
unnecessarily humiliating’ for the Greek nation (Gemenis and Nezi, 2015: 22). This is 
another indication that, despite its salience and persistence, the populism/anti-
populism divide is not static: it is quite dynamic and malleable, in fact, with political 
forces having historically occupied positions at both sides of the spectrum. 
Against the anti-populist discourse of mainstream parties and media, a previously 
marginal radical-left formation started to gain momentum. The Coalition of the 
Radical Left (SYRIZA) addressed ‘the people’ through a discourse that articulated 
various popular demands and grievances against the Greek and European ‘elites’ and 
their policies of austerity along the lines of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ schema (Stavrakakis 
and Katsambekis, 2014). SYRIZA’s rise to prominence established a new, sharp 
polarisation within the Greek political system: pro-austerity/pro-memorandum 
political forces (mainly represented by PASOK and ND) against anti-austerity/anti-
memorandum forces (mainly represented by SYRIZA). Along with SYRIZA, 
Independent Greeks (ANEL), a new political party that emerged from a split in ND in 
2012, would enter parliament, expressing right-wing and nationalist populist 
sentiments and gradually creating links with SYRIZA, leading to the collaboration of 
the two parties in government after January 2015. Not surprisingly, ‘opponents and 
critics of the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition’ framed their opposition to the government 
‘predominantly as a noble battle against populism’ (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser, 2016: 
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5). Thus, cutting across ideological-political persuasions, the opposition between 
populism and anti-populism would coincide from January 2015 onwards with that 
between government (populists) and opposition (anti-populists), while during the 
previous period it had been exactly the opposite.  
Populist and Anti-Populist Actors in a Period of Realignment (2012–2016) 
In order to understand the dynamic of SYRIZA and relate it to the emerging 
populism/anti-populism cleavage, we need to take into account the inability of 
traditional parties to offer a convincing narrative able to address the post-2010 
systemic dislocation and its spillover into a crisis of political representation. Their 
favoured communication strategy – to blame both ‘populism’ for the crisis as the 
main symptom of the malaise of the post-authoritarian era as well as ‘the people’ 
themselves as the irresponsible beneficiaries of a democratisation process that went 
too far – eventually failed to contain popular reaction; instead, it fuelled indignation. 
On the other side, SYRIZA engaged with the demands of the anti-austerity movement, 
trying to represent impoverished and disenfranchised social groups in its discourse, 
constructing and performing, in this way, its own version of the ‘crisis’, attributing the 
blame to the ‘old’ ‘two-party establishment’ (PASOK/ND) and to the neoliberal 
policies imposed by the EU and the IMF (Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014; 
Katsambekis, 2016b). In terms of style and communication strategy, reactivating 
Andreas Panadreou’s tactic, Alexis Tsipras, SYRIZA’s leader, likewise refrained 
from wearing ties and engaged in the public articulation of the previously unsayable, 
both at the local and international level – with a lot of help from an outspoken Yanis 
Varoufakis (Stavrakakis, 2015). An example here is Varoufakis’ now infamous joint 
press conference with Jeroen Dijsselbloem in which the former characterized the 
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‘troika’ as ‘a rottenly constructed committee’ with which Greece would no longer co-
operate (Hope and Wagstyl 2015). Another example comes again from Varoufakis, 
who described austerity as ‘fiscal waterboarding’ (Hüetlin and Neubacher 2015), 
while we could also add Tsipras’ sharp public critique of the EU’s democratic deficit 
and the lack of accountability of institutions like the Eurogroup, along with his 
statements that the SYRIZA-led government prioritises paying pensions and salaries 
to servicing its debt obligations to the IMF (Spiegel 2015). 
The increasing hegemonic potential of SYRIZA further reinforced the anti-populism 
of the established party and media systems: a quasi-apocalyptic discourse, marked by 
a strong anti-populist emphasis, was thus articulated, a discourse that intensified even 
further after 2012, when SYRIZA achieved second place in the national elections. In 
this context, demonisation, blame attribution and fearmongering seemed to have taken 
the place of political confrontation based on exchange of arguments, in an 
antagonistic schema that left very little room for compromise and created the 
conditions for a climate of ‘blind polarisation’ (Katsambekis, 2016a, 2016b) to 
emerge. 
Contemporary research has offered ample evidence to support this account of the 
reactivation and consolidation of a populism/anti-populism frontier (Stavrakakis et al., 
2016, 2017). For example, within the POPULISMUS research project, we have 
participated in the construction of a populism index utilised in the Greek Candidate 
Study of 2015 (part of the joint multi-national project Comparative Candidate 
Survey/CCS). Taking into account a series of studies on populist attitudes (e.g. 
Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012), this index was based on a reformulated 
battery of eight (five-point Likert) items. Six of those items were drawn from the 
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battery proposed to CSES, one item (the one concerning the moral dimension) was 
excluded, and two additional items were added. In this context, our index measures 
populist attitudes based on a battery that is in line with a discursive approach to 
populism based on ‘minimal criteria’  (Stavrakakis et al., 2016: 8–9; see also 
Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014). On the basis of 520 questionnaires completed 
between February and July 2015 (after the election of January 2015), it has become 
possible to distinguish two distinct (and indeed antagonistic) party groups along the 
populism/anti-populism axis: on the one side we find ANEL and SYRIZA (partners in 
government since January 2015); on the other PASOK and ND (partners in 
government from late 2011 and throughout 2014), along with the centrist-liberal 
RIVER4 (see Figure 1; for more details of our methodology see Stavrakakis et al., 
2016). 
 
FIGURE 1 HERE 
                                                 
4 The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and Golden Dawn (GD) have always and consistently refused 
to provide a list of email addresses for their candidates. They were thus not included in the survey (see 
Stavrakakis et al. 2016: 8–9). 
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Figure 1: Populism Index by political party. 
 
Source: Stavrakakis et al. 2016: 11. 
 
Moreover, in an effort to corroborate the existence of a similar divide in the media, 
we surveyed a series of corpora constructed on the basis of a total of 17,363 articles to 
which we had access, published in the Greek printed press between 1 June 2014 and 
31 May 2015 (for a detailed analysis, see Nikisianis et al., 2016). After qualitative 
assessment, 928 among these articles from forty newspapers and magazines were 
considered relevant (based on references to ‘populism,’ ‘the people’ and ‘popular 
sovereignty/will’) and were subsequently coded. A maximum effort was made to 
include, with proportional representation, all the views that have been identified 
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(following the logic of qualitative stratified sampling). Those articles were 
categorised according to four main criteria:  
1. Positive stance towards populism and/or ‘the people,’ ‘popular sovereignty’, 
etc. (those articles are not necessarily populist, but express what can be termed 
as ‘populist friendly’ views).  
2. Clear anti-populist positioning.  
3. Neutral stance towardspopulism.  
4. No reference to populism but rather to other notions, such as ‘democracy’, 
‘crisis’, etc. 
What emerged from this analysis was, once more, a clear division between ostensibly 
‘anti-populist’ and ‘pro-populist’ media and articles (see Table 1). Moreover, this 
study established the polarisation implicit in pro-populist discourse, but also the 
demonisation of ‘populism’ (and the political forces denounced as populist, mainly 
SYRIZA) by the anti-populist press (where populism is often metaphorically 
described as a plague, gangrene, cancer, madness, schizophrenia, etc.).  
Two main observations follow: (1) the populism/anti-populism divide is clearly 
reflected in the Greek press; (2) the anti-populist press, which is clearly dominant in 
quantitative terms (see Table 1; see also Nikisianis et al., 2016: 56), very often uses 
profoundly bellicose and dismissive language against alleged ‘populists’, 
characterising them as threatening, pathogenic or parasitic entities that should be 
eradicated. This means that it is not only populist actors that privilege 
antagonistic/polarising confrontation in the public sphere, but also – and sometimes 
even more strongly – self-proclaimed ‘anti-populist’ actors, aiming to establish their 
own divisions and polarities.  
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TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1. Coding of pro-populist and anti-populist articles in the Greek Press 
(June 2014 – May 2015) 
Coding Articles Percentage % 
Pro-populist 213 23.20 
Anti-populist 489 53.27 
Neutral 23 2.51 
No references 193 21.02 
Total 918 100.00 
Source: Nikisianis et al., 2016: 56 
 
After SYRIZA came to power in January 2015, Greece entered a new period of 
turbulence. When negotiations with the country’s European partners reached a 
deadlock, Tsipras called for a referendum on the ‘bail-out’ terms proposed to Greece. 
The citizens rejected the proposed deal by a majority of 61.31 per cent. The days 
preceding the referendum were revealing about the depth the populism/anti-populism 
frontier had acquired on a variety of levels. As noted by Paris Aslanidis and Cristóbal 
Rovira Kaltwasser, it rallied ‘the sum of the media establishment behind an openly 
pro-YES, pro-European campaign, applying immense pressure on the government and 
subsequently confirming the anti-establishment credentials of the populist government 
in the eyes of many’ (Aslanidis and Kaltwasser, 2016: 9). 
 Yet SYRIZA soon had to retreat and accept a new bail-out agreement. As a result, its 
populist discourse has gradually toned down, although it has not vanished 
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(Katsambekis 2017). But the anti-populist opposition’s discourse seems to have 
become even more bellicose and polarising. We might have expected to see this 
narrative disappear or at least become milder in tone after SYRIZA had started to 
implement a programme that was agreed with Greece’s European partners and the 
situation started to stabilise somewhat. On the contrary, the anti-populist narrative 
fuelled by mainstream media and traditional/mainstream parties intensified. In fact, it 
became the cornerstone of the official campaign of the main opposition party, ND, 
which now declared as its ultimate aim to defeat the populism incarnated in SYRIZA, 
constantly urging Tsipras to resign (Samaras, 2016; Mitsotakis, 2016a; Mitsotakis, 
2016b). Interestingly, Kyriakos Mitsotakis’s (son of Konstantinos and leader of ND 
since January 2016) social media slogan (‘Leave!,’ hashtag #fygete), introduced in 
spring 2016, closely resembles the one that SYRIZA used back in 2012 against the 
coalition government of ND, PASOK and DIMAR.5 
In a similar manner, mainstream media, like the newspapers To Vima (centre-left) and 
Kathimerini (centre-right), continue to attack the SYRIZA-led government as a 
serious threat to the country’s development and to its democratic institutions with 
reference to its alleged populism, comparing Tsipras to Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro 
and other populist leaders from around the world. Some commentators and journalists 
even suggest that Tsipras wishes to establish a new ‘regime’ in Greece (the ‘SYRIZA 
regime’), based on clientelism and the illiberal manipulation of institutions (mainly 
                                                 
5 ‘Greece cannot bear you anymore Mr Tsipras. Leave.’ read the motto of Mitsotakis’s Twitter 
campaign, initiated in March 2016, while SYRIZA’s slogan in 2012 was ‘You are destroying the 
country. Leave now.’ See https://twitter.com/kmitsotakis/status/714880661719486466; 
https://left.gr/news/i-sygklonistiki-paroysia-ton-voyleyton-toy-syriza-ekm-sti-sygkentrosi-toy-laoy-
vinteo.  
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the media and the judiciary),6 and which would enable the (populist) left to stay in 
power permanently (Papadopoulos 2016; Kroustali 2016). Within this narrative, 
commentators in mainstream newspapers rarely miss the chance to equate the 
populism of the left with that of the right: ‘Right-wing populism is similar to left-wing 
[populism]. The only thing that changes are the symbols, the flags and banners at the 
demonstrations of the outraged popular masses …’ (Coutifaris 2017). What is more, 
by equating the radical left with the extreme right, anti-populist commentators can 
easily reaffirm the populism/anti-populism divide, equating populism with the 
irrational and uneducated masses and anti-populism with rational meritocracy: 
The political convergence of the postmodern Left with the lunatic Right 
illustrates the power of populism against rationalism in our days. The 
postmodern leftist perception converges with that of the Right in the hate 
of the ‘little man’, either right-wing or left-wing, against the educated 
and the aristoi … (Veremis 2017). 
Our observations here confirm the findings of recent studies that stress anti-populism 
as one of the main characteristics of mainstream media in Greece (see Lialiouti and 
Bithymitris, 2013; Mylonas 2014), while it is also crucial to note the often deeply 
moralistic character of anti-populist discourse. Needless to say, such pronounced anti-
populism is not a peculiar characteristic of the Greek case; in Portugal, for example, it 
still seems to condition the overall positioning of the country’s party system and 
media, preventing the establishment of significant populist actors in the crisis setting, 
                                                 
6 Such accusations have intensified following the failure of an attempt by the government to regulate 
the media field (issuing a limited number of television licences) and disagreements with the judiciary 
on many court decisions affecting its media law and taxation policies. 
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but – crucially – allowing the hegemonic emergence of non-populist alternatives 
(Salgado, 2018). 
Conclusion 
In this article, we have attempted to shed light on crucial aspects of the antagonistic 
dialectic between populist and anti-populist discourses in the Greek context. 
Presenting a diachronic reading of this antagonistic relationship, we have argued that 
the populism/anti-populism antithesis may be understood as a salient discursive divide, 
which becomes ‘reactivated’ and indeed dominant in conditions of ‘failure’ or 
‘dislocation,’ like those brought about by the recent economic crisis. 
Highlighting this persistent antagonistic relationship is a response to arguments that 
consider Greece a populist democracy (Pappas, 2014: 36). In our genealogy, Greece’s 
political system is a terrain on which populist and anti-populist actors construct rival 
hegemonic projects; at times, the one or the other (temporarily) prevails, while 
periodic crises can reactivate and further intensify associated polarities. In this sense, 
looking back at the previous decades of Greece’s democratic history, although it is 
true that most governing and main opposition parties have indeed used 
confrontational and simplistic discourses, it is very difficult to find a period in which 
both such parties could be simultaneously regarded as populist.  
What also emerges from our analysis is that often it is anti-populist discourses that 
purport to pre-empt popular mobilisations, by denouncing any opposition as ‘populist’. 
Indeed, it is only against the dominance of the anti-populist camp in the country’s 
public discourse from the mid-1990s onwards that the recent electoral success of the 
populist radical left (SYRIZA) can be registered as a (populist) anomaly. This anti-
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populist orientation has been reflected in recent surveys of the Greek press, 
contradicting accounts that consider that populism is dominant Greece’s public 
discourse (Pappas 2014; Vamvakas, 2015). 
What is more, the polarisation patterns observed seem to acquire an autonomous 
dynamic, independent from the policies implemented. Hence, even after SYRIZA’s 
capitulation in July 2015, the populism/anti-populism divide continues to dominate 
Greek politics, media and academic discourse, constantly constructing polarities with 
reference to various policy issues (from referendums to constitutional review and 
from the electoral law to education reform).  
Last but not least, what emerges as a crucial issue in the preceding analysis is the very 
nature of the populism/anti-populism divide. For example, does it constitute a proper 
cleavage? Following Vít Hloušek (2010), on the basis of the Greek example we can 
maintain that it is in discourse that cleavages are (partially) constructed, represented 
and enacted. Thus, if a ‘divide’ designates a sharp discursive opposition privileged 
within a given conjuncture, then a divide which has become salient and hegemonic in 
public discourse throughout a significant period may be designated as a ‘cleavage’. 
To the extent that we can observe such a salience in the populism/anti-populism 
divide throughout Greece’s democratic history, and given that it has consistently 
acquired a key position in signifying political stakes and antagonisms, manifesting on 
the discursive, the attitudinal (see candidate survey) and the press/media levels (see 
press analysis), operating along or even penetrating more traditional cleavages (e.g. 
left/right), one might feel inclined to suggest that the populism/anti-populism 
discursive frontier may be understood as an emerging cleavage. Building on the 
salience of a high/low divide in many contexts, Pierre Ostiguy has indeed correlated it 
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with the antagonism between populism and anti-populism, elevating it into a proper 
cleavage (2009: 23–24). The preceding analysis of populist and anti-populist 
representations in the Greek context seems to confirm the salience of such a high/low, 
populism/anti-populism antagonism in the Greek context, offering thus new evidence 
in support of such a discursive-performative theorisation of cleavages.  
This orientation should not be confused with the aforementioned ‘populist democracy’ 
argument. This thesis sees Greek political culture as divided by only ‘one single 
cleavage ostensibly separating “the people” from a host of political and economic 
elites, whether domestic (such as the old parties, but also young ones like Potami) or 
foreign (such as the Troika)’ (Pappas, 2015; see also Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). And 
yet, this thesis seems to suffer from two weaknesses: 
1) Even if one is prepared to accept the populism/anti-populism divide as an emerging 
cleavage, to argue that it constitutes the only one within the Greek context crucially 
ignores the fact that, in a variety of important issues, both populist and anti-populist 
forces have voted in line with their left/right affiliation. For example, on same-sex 
civil unions, the creation of a mosque in Athens and the naturalisation of immigrant 
children, SYRIZA and ANEL, the two populist coalition partners, have voted in 
opposing ways in line with a left/right cleavage or a GAL/TAN division (Stavrakakis 
et al., 2016).  
2) Most crucially, however, what type of cleavage can that be in which all sides 
involved espouse the same articulatory/framing strategy and fall under the same 
category (populism)? This paradoxical conclusion, which goes against the genealogy 
we have presented, can only be sustained at the expense of a rigorous definition of 
populism and of the complex choreography between populism and anti-populism. For 
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example, it often relies on an equation between populism and clientelism 
(Vasilopoulou et al., 2013: 13), which has been long ago discredited by Nicos 
Mouzelis (1986). It is only on the basis of such misunderstandings that the cleavage 
between populism and anti-populism, bottom-up and top-down incorporation, low and 
high, can be camouflaged as an intra-populist division and Greek political culture as a 
whole can be designated as ‘populist’ in toto. 
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